Why Encryption Keys Must Live Outside Third Parties — and How Zero Trust Data Solves the Problem

key management

Feb 6

A recent episode of the Hacker And The Fed podcast, “From Doorbell Cameras to Seized Crypto,” explores the uncomfortable intersection of encryption, cloud platforms, and government access. What begins as a conversation about investigations and digital evidence ultimately highlights a critical cybersecurity lesson:

If a third party controls your encryption keys, they control your data.

The episode uses Microsoft’s BitLocker key recovery system as a real-world example of how well-intentioned convenience features can quietly undermine true data privacy. It also reinforces a growing consensus in the security community: modern organizations need encryption models where keys are managed completely outside the applications and platforms that hold the data.

That model is known as Zero Trust Data with External Key Management.

The Core Problem: Cloud-Stored Keys Undermine Encryption

In the podcast, the hosts discuss cases where encrypted systems were accessed because recovery keys were stored in a Microsoft account. This is common practice: many enterprises allow BitLocker, Office 365, or other platforms to escrow encryption keys in the cloud so users don’t lose access.

From an IT operations standpoint, this is convenient.
From a privacy and security standpoint, it creates a fundamental contradiction.

When encryption keys are stored with the same provider that stores your data:

The provider can be compelled to produce those keys under subpoena or warrant.
Administrators at the provider may have technical access.
A compromise of the provider can compromise your encrypted information.
The user or organization is no longer the ultimate authority over access.

In other words, the data may be encrypted, but it is not truly under your control.

This is what the podcast subtly exposes: traditional encryption models often protect data from hackers, but not from the platform itself.

Encryption Without Independent Keys Is Not Zero Trust

True Zero Trust principles assume that no system, platform, or provider should be implicitly trusted.

Yet most mainstream security architectures violate this principle at the data layer:

Files are encrypted by the same service that stores them
Keys are backed up to the same identity provider that manages access
Cloud administrators can reset or recover encrypted content

This model effectively creates a master keyholder: Microsoft, Google, Amazon, or whichever SaaS platform you rely on.

The Hacker And The Fed episode illustrates why that model is risky. Law enforcement doesn’t need to break encryption if it can simply ask the platform for the keys.

The Solution: External Key Management for Zero Trust Data

The way to eliminate this risk is straightforward in concept, but transformative in practice:

Separate the encryption keys from the applications, clouds, and platforms that hold the data.

This is the foundation of Zero Trust Data architecture.

With external key management:

Data is encrypted before it ever reaches a third party
Keys are generated and stored in a system completely independent of Microsoft, Google, AWS, or any SaaS platform
No provider ever has the technical ability to decrypt the content
Access policies travel with the data itself

Even if a cloud provider is served with a lawful request, they cannot produce what they do not possess.

How Zero Trust Data Changes the Equation

External key management fundamentally alters the dynamics described in the podcast:

Traditional Model

Platform stores your data
Platform holds or backs up keys
Admins can access content
Provider can be compelled to decrypt

Zero Trust Data Model

Platform stores encrypted data only
Keys live in a customer-controlled vault
Admins see only ciphertext
Decryption is technically impossible without your keys

This approach delivers what encryption was always meant to provide: exclusive control by the data owner.

Practical Benefits Beyond Legal Protection

While the podcast focuses on investigative scenarios, the advantages extend much further:

Protection against insider threats at cloud providers
Elimination of single-point-of-failure key repositories
Stronger compliance with ITAR, GDPR, HIPAA, and CMMC
True data sovereignty across regions and platforms
The ability to revoke access instantly by disabling keys

External key management turns encryption into an active, enforceable control rather than a checkbox feature.

The Takeaway

The stories in Hacker And The Fed underscore a reality many organizations overlook:

Encryption alone is not enough. Key control is everything.

As long as recovery keys or decryption capabilities reside with Microsoft or any other third party, encrypted data remains subject to external access.

Zero Trust Data architectures with independent, external key management finally close that gap — ensuring that: